Improving the Ethical Guidelines for Assistant United States Attorneys Who Are Considering the Declination of a Law Enforcement Agent\u27s Recommendation to Prosecute by Cerdan, Elhrick J.
Criminal Law Practitioner 
Volume 2 Issue 1 Article 6 
2014 
Improving the Ethical Guidelines for Assistant United States 
Attorneys Who Are Considering the Declination of a Law 
Enforcement Agent's Recommendation to Prosecute 
Elhrick J. Cerdan 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cerdan, Elhrick J. (2014) "Improving the Ethical Guidelines for Assistant United States Attorneys Who Are 
Considering the Declination of a Law Enforcement Agent's Recommendation to Prosecute," Criminal Law 
Practitioner: Vol. 2 : Iss. 1 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol2/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ American University Washington 
College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Criminal Law Practitioner by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact 
kclay@wcl.american.edu. 
Criminal Law Practitioner
IMPROVING THE ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR ASSISTANT
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS WHO ARE CONSIDERING THE
DECLINATION OF A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENT'S
RECOMMENDATION TO PROSECUTE
by E/brick Joseph Cerdan
I. Introduction
Imagine an eastbound interstate high-
way somewhere in the American Midwest
on a warm summer evening. As a seasoned
federal agent with several years of investiga-
tive experience, the local sheriff has contacted
you for assistance with the interview of a male
subject. The local sheriff's deputy pulled over
the young man during a routine traffic stop,
which led to the discovery of multiple pounds
of high quality methamphetamine and several
thousand dollars hidden within the vehicle.
You introduce yourself to the young man,
show him your credentials, and ask him if he
is willing to waive his rights as per Miranda.
He agrees, and you conduct a consensual in-
terview.
After the interview is completed, you
determine that the young man was acting as
a trusted deliveryman for a foreign drug traf-
ficking organization. He admitted to you that
he knew what he was transporting across
the United States and that the money was
his payment for services rendered. Based on
your training and experience, you conclude
that you have probable cause that at least one
federal crime has been committed. Prior to
conducting a warrantless arrest and preparing
a criminal complaint, you call the duty (or on-
call) Assistant United States Attorney to con-
firm that federal prosecution will be accepted
by the local United States Attorney's Office.
The Assistant United States Attorney
listens to your facts, but despite your recom-
mendation, declines the case on the spot. He
states that the weight of methamphetamine
and the amount of money does not reach
his office's required minimum threshold for
prosecution. You then decide to call the lo-
cal county district attorney's office and refer
the case to them. They accept prosecution
on similar state charges, and the case is suc-
cessfully prosecuted. However, the defendant
receives a lesser sentence than he would have
received in the federal system.
Unfortunately, instances like this oc-
cur across the United States far too often.
They involve different federal law enforce-
ment agencies, United States Attorneys' Of-
fices, and investigations, but the result is the
same: federal prosecutions that would lead to
convictions are needlessly turned down. These
declinations result from an unaddressed need
for ethical guidance for Assistant United
States Attorneys who make the important
decision to decline or accept a case for federal
prosecution. The current ethical guidelines are
inadequate. The guidelines either address only
the ethical standards for accepting a case for
prosecution, or they are silent as to any ethical
standards for appropriate declinations. There
is no black letter rule that federal prosecutors
can look to for guidance in these situations.
II. Overview
As in the above-mentioned vignette,
when a federal law enforcement agent is pre-
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paring to make a warrantless arrest, the agent
must contact the local United States Attor-
ney's Office (USAO) to confirm that federal
prosecution will be accepted. However, agents
can contact the local USAO to present cases
at earlier and more convenient times during
an investigation. Perhaps the need for a search
warrant, a subpoena, or simply some legal
advice may prompt the agent to present a case
earlier than at the criti-
cal time of a warrantless THESE DECLN! O
arrest.
How an agent
presents a case depends ETH CAL GU DA
on which district he is
contacting. Each USAO UN TED STAT
has its own unique pro-
cedure on how to accept MAKNG THE M[
or decline a case. For
example, some USAOs TIO LNE A C
have a "duty" Assistant
United States Attorney
(AUSA), who has been
provided with a "duty" or "on-call" cellular
phone. The duty AUSA is required to an-
swer phone calls 24 hours a day for a certain
period of time, ranging from one day to one
week. The agents in the area are then given
that phone number and have specific instruc-
tions to contact that number to present a case.
Other USAOs allow agents to contact any
AUSA at that USAO and present any case to
them directly. Agents will contact AUSAs tiat
they have worked with in the past success-
fully, or they may "shop" around for one that
is held in high regard by law enforcement. In
addition, other USAOs only allow agents to
contact a supervisory AUSA and present the
case to them.. Which supervisor is contacted
would depend on the facts and type of the
case (narcotics, white collar crimes, immigra-
tion enforcement, etc.).
If the case is accepted, then the agent is
assigned an AUSA to work within the investi-
gation. In the vignette above, the agent would
proceed with the warrantless arrest with the




should the case be declined, the agent has sev-
eral options available. The agent can make the
decision to close the investigation due to the
declination of federal prosecution. This could
result in agency-specific reports, explaining
why the investigation was closed without an
arrest, indictment, conviction, etc. If time and
resources permit, the agent can continue to
work the investigation, gathering more facts
and/or evidence of a
ARE A RESUT OF federal crime, and at-
f- r-,_1tempt to re-present the
S D case to the local USAO
later. Finally,' the agent
-OR can contact the state or
dlocal prosecutor's office
emptand present the case
lANT OEM CcON to them. However, thisis contingent on there
being an applicable
state charge which the
local office would be
able to prosecute based
on their office's limited
resources.
Regardless of which option the agent
chooses, the declination of the case by the lo-
cal USAO has consequences affecting parties
throughout the criminal justice system. The
burden on the state or local prosecutor's offic-
es increases as more cases are added to their
already large caseload. State prosecutors in
large cities throughout the United States often
have hundreds of cases assigned to them,
while federal prosecutors enjoy much lower
caseloads. Those cases are then prosecuted
with lesser state charges when compared to
the potential federal charges. The state charges
usually carry lesser sentences than their feder-
al equivalents. In addition, due to overcrowd-
ing in state penal institutions, oftentimes the
defendant will not serve the entire sentence,
or the sentence may be deferred altogether
(comparatively, there is no deferred sentencing
or opportunities for parole for the defendant
in the federal criminal justice system). As the
defendants get their sentences deferred, word
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spreads throughout the criminal underworld.
Just like legitimate businesses, these crimi-
nal organizations make strategic decisions on
where to set up their networks. The organiza-
tions decide which states, or jurisdictions, to
travel through when conducting their busi-
ness, depending on the aggressiveness of the
federal and/or state prosecutors within that ju-
risdiction. Instead of deterring crime through
effective prosecutions, less aggressive USAOs
may be encouraging criminal activity through
their case declinations.
Likewise, the case declinations also
affect the federal law enforcement agencies
and their personnel in the district. Agents
may feel resentment towards their USAOs or
that their investigative work is inadequate or
unappreciated. Agencies may survive on suc-
cessful state prosecutions alone, depending on
whether their statistics differentiate between a
state and federal prosecution. However, fed-
eral law enforcement agencies have specific
federal statutory authority, which allows them
to achieve complex and far reaching federal
prosecutions. If the agencies continue to rely
on state prosecutions, each agency and its per-
sonnel may not be achieving the most effective
results based on their original federal statu-
tory authority.
Each USAO and its individual person-
nel are also affected by the case declinations.
When management turns down potential
prosecutions, they are denying career-oriented
attorneys experience on quality cases. Federal
criminal investigations can be complex, involv-
ing multiple defendants and charges, ranging
from conspiracy to more sophisticated charges
such as racketeering. Attorneys lose the op-
portunity to prosecute these complex cases,
hone their litigation skills, and increase their
overall experience. A lower caseload would
also reflect on the USAOs annual perfor-
mance statistics.
III. Background
A. The United States Attorney's Offices
The U.S. Attorney is considered the
chief federal law enforcement officer within
his or her jurisdiction.' There is one appointed
U.S. Attorney for each of the nation's ninety-
four judicial districts (Guam and the Northern
Mariana Islands are served by a single U.S. At-
torney). They are appointed. by the President
of the United States for a term of four years
and may continue to serve until a successor
is appointed. Each appointment is subject to
the confirmation of the United States Senate.'
Once confirmed, each U.S. Attorney is subject
to removal by the President at any time before
the expiration of their term., Interim, or act-
ing, U.S. Attorneys are appointed by the Attor-
ney General of the United States.) The Attor-
ney General is the highest-ranking official and
head of the U.S. Department of Justice, which
is the nation's federal executive department
responsible for the enforcement of federal law
and administration of justice.
The U.S. Attorney position is the equiv-
alent of an Assistant Attorney General in the
U.S. Department of Justice's organizational
hierarchy. This is significant because each U.S.
Attorney reports directly to the Deputy Attor-
ney General's Office, who is the second high-
est ranking official within the Department.
As such, the position carries great prestige,
authority, and autonomy. Each U.S. Attorney
effectively has carte blanche on how to struc-
ture and manage his or her USAO.
Every U.S. Attorney has the ability to
organize his or her USAO in a unique con-
figuration, depending on factors such as th.e
size of the district, the types of cases common
in the district, or the district's history. How-
ever, there are certain common features within
1 U.S. Attomeys' Manual 9-2.010 (U.S.A.M.), 2000
WL 1708082 (2009).
2 28 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2001).
3 Id. at 541(b).
4 Id. at 541(c).
5 Id at 546(a).
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each USAO. Each U.S. Attorney will likely
have a First Assistant, or Deputy U.S. Attorney,
who acts as the second highest ranking official
in that USAO. USAOs will generally have a
separate criminal division and civil division,
each managed by a division chief (who in turn
may have his or her own deputies).' Some
USAOs may further divide their divisions into
units that specialize in particular cases, and
supervised by unit chiefs. The larger districts
will have divisions divided geographically. For
example, the Southern District of Texas has
its principal office in Houston, Texas, with six
smaller, divisional offices spread throughout
the District. The day-to-day responsibilities for
handling prosecutions and working with law
enforcement personnel within the USAO are
handled by the AUSAs. AUSAs are appointed,
and subject to removal, by the Attorney Gen-
eral.7
A.s the "workhorses" of each USAO,
the AUSAs are at times faced with the deci-
sion whether to proceed with prosecution.
The ability of any law enforcement agent
(including prosecutors) to decide whether to
investigate and proceed with the prosecution
of a case is known as prosecutorial discretion.
As stated by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics, "the decision to prosecute a suspect in a
criminal matter depends on many factors, in-
cluding the Attorney General's priorities, U.S.
Attorney priorities and resources, laws gov-
erning each type of offense, and the strength
of evidence in each case."' Among the factors
that AUSAs consider when applying prosecu-
torial discretion are the ethical guidelines that
all American lawyers follow. The guidelines
have evolved throughout history to the current
codes that modern lawyers are tested on prior
to their admission to the bar, and practice by
afterwards.
6 Daniel J. Fetterman & Mark P. Goodman, Defending
Corporations and Individuals in Government Investigations,
Defending Corp. & Indiv. in Gov. Invest. § 6:3 (2012).
7 28 U.S.C. § 542(a)-(b) (2001).
8 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Home Page, http://www.
bjs.gov.
B. Sources of Ethical Guidance
The earliest codified American ethical
guidelines for lawyers were developed in Ala-
bama in the late i8oos. The Alabama State Bar
Association adopted a code of ethics in 1887
(Alabama Code), written by the 2 8" Governor
of Alabama and U.S. District Court Judge,
Thomas Goode Jones9. Judge Jones based
the Alabama Code on two earlier sources: the
lectures of Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief
Justice George Sharswood, which were pub-
lished in 1854 under the title of Professional
Ethics, and the fifty resolutions found in David
Hoffman's A Course ofLegalStudy (2d ed. 1836),
one of the first written American law school
texts. The Alabama Code was later adopted
by eleven states and led to the development of
the American Bar Association's (ABA) Canons
of Professional Ethics, the first set of ethi-
cal guidelines for lawyers nationwide by the
ABA".
The Alabama Code consisted of fifty-six
generalized rules that were adopted for the
guidance of the Alabama State Bar Associa-
tion's members. Rule 12 of the Alabama Code
addressed "the Defense and Prosecution of
Criminal Cases" stating,
an attorney appearing or continuing
as private counsel in the prosecution
for a crime of which he believes the
accused innocent, for swears himself.
The State's attorney is criminal, if he
presses for a conviction, when upon
the evidence he believes the pris-
oner innocent. If the evidence is not
plain enough to justify a nolle pros.,
a public prosecutor should submit
the case, with such comments as are
pertinent, accompanied by a candid
statement of his own doubts."
9 Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887
Code ofEthics of the Alabama State Bar Association, 49 ALA.
L. REv. 471, 481-82 (1998).
10 Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility Preface (1969).
11 American Bar Association, Canons ofProfessional
Ethics Centennial, available at http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional responsibility/resources/canonsjprofes-
sional ethics centennial.html.
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The rule does not specifically address
the acceptance of a case for prosecution. How-
ever, it does set the first minimum standard for
prosecution: if the prosecutor pursues a con-
viction when the evidence shows the defen-
dant is innocent, then the prosecutor could be
criminally liable.
Following the Alabama Code, the next
milestone in American legal ethics took place
in August of 19o8 in Seattle, Washington. At
the annual ABA meeting, the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics were adopted for nationwide
use by the legal community. They consisted
of thirty-two individual canons, as well as a
sample lawyer "oath of admission" for states
to consider when crafting their own oaths. Of
all the canons, only the fifth canon, titled "The
Defense or Prosecution of Those Accused of
Crime," specifically addressed prosecutorial
conduct. Yet, it did not significantly improve
upon the Alabama Code's minimum prosecu-
tonal standard. It specified that the primary
duty of a prosecutor was not to achieve a crim-
inal conviction, but to ensure that justice was
executed. This served a noteworthy purpose:
to give prosecutors across the nation a broad,
uniform mission statement, regardless of their
employer. This mission statement was vague,
however, and did not address case acceptance.
By the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury, the legal community determined that the
ABA's Canons were in need of an update. The
Canons did not provide sufficient guidance
on many situations and were not designed
for disciplinary action. In August 1969, af-
ter months of committee meelings, the ABA
House of Delegates approved a Model Code
of Professional Conduct (Model Code). The
Model Code consisted of nine Canons, each
containing Ethical Considerations, and Disci-
plinary Rules. The Canons and Ethical Con-
siderations were designed to be aspirational,
guiding lawyers in their daily professional
lives. The Disciplinary Rules were designed
to be mandatory, setting a miiimum standard
by which all lawyers could be judged by the
bar and the pLiblic. However, just as the car-
lier Canons, the Model Code did not carry the
force of law.'
Prosecutors in particular were guided
and bound by the Model Code's Canon 7: "A
Lawyer Should Represent A Client Zealously
Within the Bounds of the Law." Ethical Con-
sideration (EC) 7-13 specifically addressed the
special duties of a prosecutor. It restated the
1908 Canon's goal of achieving justice rather
than conviction. The special duties exist, as
EC 7-13 states, because "the prosecutor repre-
sents the sovereign and therefore should use
restraint in the discretionary exercise of gov-
ernmental powers, such as in the selection of
cases to prosecute."'' The EC also stated prin-
ciples of discovery, such as revealing damaging
evidence, despite its detrimental effect on the
prosecutor's case. Although vague, EC-7-13
addresses case selection by prosecutors and
the "restraint" that they should use in their
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The EC
builds upon the Alabama Code's minimum
prosecutorial standard by adding the term "re-
straint," rather than suggesting that the pros-
ecutor is "criminal" if the standard is not met.
Within Canon 7, Disciplinary Rule (DR)
7-1o3 sets a mandatory standard when seeking
prosecution and providing discovery. DR 7-1o3
was based on Canon 5 from the 1908 Canons.
Section (a) states that a prosecutor should not
proceed with a prosecution if he knows that
there is not sufficient probable cause. Section
(b) restates the disclosure of harmful evidence
during discovery as found in EC 7 -3. Just as
in the 1908 Canons, this only addressed the
threshold for case acceptance, but was silent
as to when declinations are appropriate.
Shortly after adoption, the Model Code
began to draw criticism from the legal com-
munity. In fact, even the Model Code's Pref-
12 Phillip K. Lyon & Bruce H. Phillips, Professional
Responsibility in the Federal Courts: Consistency is Cloaked
in Confusion, 50 ARK. L. REV. 59, 63 (1997).
13 Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 7-13
(1969).
14 Id.
15 Phillip K. Lyon & Bruce H. Phillips, Professional
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ace admitted that there were at least four areas
that would need revision in the future." When
compared to the ABA Canons, the structure
of the Model Code was complicated. 9 "Some
critics described the three part structure as
irrational and unworkable."" There were criti-
cisms that some of the Ethical Considerations
were in conflict with their matching Disciplin-
ary Rules. 9 Also, the nine Canons and their
Ethical Considerations did not carry any dis-
ciplinary ramifications. Rather than enumer-
ate black letter rules, the consistent vagueness
throughout the Model Code merely created
an "ethical mood," subject to interpretation by
the local bars.
In response to the criticism of the Mod-
el Code, as well as the negative perception of
lawyers following the "Watergate" scandal, the
ABA created a commission to revise the Model
Code.2 Known as the Kutak Commission, after
the commission chair Robert Kutak, this com-
mittee published the first draft of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules)
in J98o.2 These Model Rules were styled after
the American Law Institute's ALI) Restate-
ments of the Law, which are black letter rules
covering various legal subjects. 3 The Model
Rules provide a body of ethical principles that
a lawyer could look to for guidance in differ-
Responsibility in the Federal Courts: Consistency is Cloaked
in Confusion, 50 ARK. L. REV. 59, 62 (1997).
16 John F. Sutton, Jr., The American Bar Association
Code ofProfessional Responsibility: An Introduction, 48 TEX.
L. REV. 255, 257 (1970).
17 Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73
TEX. L. REV. 335, 339 (1994).
18 John M. A. DiPippa, Lon Fuller The Model Code,
and The Model Rules, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 303, 344 (1996).
19 Id.
20 John F. Sutton, Jr., The American Bar Association
Code ofProfessional Responsibility: An Introduction, 48 TEX.
L. REV. 255, 257 (1970).
21 Sylvia E. Stevens, Bar Counsel: New (and Evolving)
Developments in the Disciplinary Rules, 62-APR Or. St. B.
Bull. 27 (2002).
22 Cynthia M. Jacob, A Polemic Against R. C. 1. 7(c)
(2): The "Appearance ofImpropriety" Rule, 177-June N.J.
LAw. 23 (1996).
23 Gregory C. Sisk, A briefhistory ofprqfessional rules
of ethics for lawyers, 16 Ia. Prac., Lawyer and Judicial Ethics
§ 3:1 (2012).
ent situations.2 The Kutak Commission elimi-
nated the confusing distinctions between Eth-
ical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules;
each Model Rule, as well as its Comments,
would be the sole starting point for any given
situation. As with the prior ethical guidelines,
the Model Rules were not binding and did not
have the force of law.
Addressing both state and federal
prosecutors, MRPC 3.8 "Special Responsibili-
ties of a Prosecutor" provided an expanded set
of rules to follow when compared to previous
ethical guidelines. MRPC 3.8 included de-
tailed rules for pre-trial activity, discovery, and
public release of information. As with prior
ethical sources, section (a) set the minimum
standard for proceeding with prosecution: if
not supported by probable cause, prosecution
should not proceed. However, MRPC 3.8 did
not include a minimum standard for declina-
tion.
In the years following the adoption of
the Model Rules, several amendments were
proposed. As recently as 2009, when the ABA
created the Commission on Ethics 20/20, law-
yers proposed changes to many of the Model
Rules. However, since its adoption, there has
been no adopted amendment to MRPC 3.8.
This could be attributed to the fact the MRPC
3.8 only affects prosecutors, a small portion of
the nation's legal community.
C. Other Sources of Guidance
Outside of the ethical sources dis-
cussed, the USAOs have other sources that
they look to for guidance. The US Attorney's
Mfanual is a point of reference for U.S. At-
torneys and AU SAs, providing general poli-
cies and procedures for the daily operation of
USAOs.2 As such, it is not a legally binding
document and only serves as internal guid-
ance for USAO personnel.21; Section 9-2.020
24 John M. A. DiPippa, Lon Fuller The Model Code,
and The Model Rules, 37 S. TEX. L. REv. 303, 345 (1996).
25 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 1-1.100 (U.S.A.M.), 1997
WL 1943989.
26 Id.
58 Washington College of Law Fall 2oI 6
Criminal Law Practitioner, Vol. 2 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol2/iss1/6
Criminal Law Practitioner
provides AUSAs guidance on declining pros-
ecution. It states that a U.S. Attorney has the
final decision on declining prosecution, unless
there is a statutory limitation that requires the
acceptance of prosecution. In practice, case
declination authority is delegated to AUSAs,
as it is not practical for the U.S. Attorney to be
involved in the daily case intake process.
Several other Sections provide addi-
tional guidance on case declination. Section
(ABA Standards). The ABA Standards, first
adopted in 1971, provide reliable guidance
through the discussion of "prevailing norms
of practice" and assist in determining what
is reasonable criminal justice attorney per-
formance.27 The primary source for the ABA
Standards was the Model Rules, but it also
aims to discuss subjects not directly covered
by the Model Rules.28 As with the previous
ethical sources, the ABA Standards have no
force of law, but their process of development
RATHR J HAN! E BLA LETFR RULES, THE LN~TN
VAG'11F -IN'S VHROU ,:1`UUT TH 1- M OL_ OOE IRAE_ 
"ETHICAL MOORW SUBJFCT TO WNERDRETATION BY THE LLCAL BARS
9-2.111 expands on the statutory limitation
mentioned in Section 9-2.020, stating that
prosecutions can be declined in certain situ-
ations if it is determined that "the ends of
public justice do not require investigation or
prosecution." Section 9-27.220 provides three
factors, in addition to the probable cause
requirement, for AUSAs to weigh when decid-
ing to decline prosecution. First, prosecution
should be declined if no substantial federal
interest would be served by the prosecution.
Second, prosecution should be declined if the
suspect would be subject to prosecution in
another jurisdiction. Finally, if there are non-
criminal alternatives to prosecution, prosecu-
tion should be declined. The Comment to
Section 9-27.220 also adds an additional con-
sideration: that there be admissible evidence
sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction.
These sections effectively raise the minimum
standard of probable cause found in the afore-
mentioned ethical sources. It seems that in
practice, AUSAs require probable cause plus
the three Section 9-27.220 factors to accept
prosecution, unless the "ends of public jus-
tice" (from Section 9-2.020) justify declination.
Another source of guidance for USAOs
is the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice
Prosecution Function and Defense Function
has successfully yielded standards that fairly
reflect widely shared professional views.29
The ABA Standards have three Stan-
dards that address case acceptance. Standard
3-1.2 restates the historical duty of the pros-
ecutor to seek justice with discretion and not
to merely seek convictions. Standard 3-2.9
addresses the prompt disposition of charges
once they are accepted and states that a pros-
ecutor should avoid any delay throughout
the process. Standard 3-3.4 resembles the
US Attorney's Manual by placing the deci-
sion to charge "initially and primarily" with
the prosecutor. The Comments for Standard
3-3.4, state that a prosecutor's office should
have a screening process for cases, to prevent
a high acquittal rate. This is comparable to the
US Attorney's Manual's Comment to Section
9-27.220, where the avoidance of acquittal is
an implied principle. In Section 9-2.101, the
US Attorney's Manual recommends that all
AUSAs become familiar with the ABA Stan-
dards since the federal courts consider them
27 Rory K. Little, The ABA'S Project to Revise the
Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution and Defense
Functions, 62 Hastings L.J. 1111, 1113 (2011).
28 Standards for Criminal Justice Prosecution Function
and Defense Function Introduction, at xii (3 ed. 1993).
29 Little, Supra note 27.
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during appropriate cases. As with the Model
Rules, the ABA Standards are silent as to
when case declination is appropriate or not.
D. Published Concerns
In 1978, a highly publicized report by
the U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO),
the audit, evaluation, and investigative arm of
the U.S. Congress, described the high levels of
case declination by the USAOs. o The report
stated that the USAOs declined to prosecute
62% of the criminal complaints available for
prosecution during fiscal years 1970-76.' Of
the 62%, the report explained that only 37%
were not prosecutable because of legitimate
reasons, such as legal deficiencies.2 There
were no explanations for the other declina-
tions. In response to the report, the U.S. De-
partment of Justice issued the Principles of
Federal Prosecution.3 3 The Principles were in-
tended to promote effective prosecutorial dis-
cretion by AUSAs, and led to revisions within
the US Atorney's IManual, such as the incl u-
sion of the three factors in Section 9-27.220. 4
In 2010, the GAO again published a
similar report. However, this report addressed
the high level of case declinations occurring in.
Indian Country (a term for the self-governing
Native American communities within the U.S.).
3 The report stated that through fiscal years
2005-o9, 5o0% of cases presented for prosecu-
tion were declined.3 6 Of the cases declined,
72% were declined for appropriate reasons,
such as weak evidence or issues with witness-
es.3
30 Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bar-
gaining Tradeoff 55 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 99 (2002).
31 U. S. Attorneys Do Not Prosecute Many Suspected
Violators Of Federal Laws - GGD-77-86, 7 (1986).
32 Id. at 8.
33 Wright, Supra note 27.
34 Id.
35 GAO-i 1-167R Declinations of Indian Country Mat-
ters, 3 (2010).
36 Id. at 3.
37 Id.
IV. Sociological and Political Forces
Inappropriate case declinations at US-
AOs across the country are partially a result
of the lack of ethical guidance. However, there
are other outside forces that can affect the
decision to accept federal prosecution. For
each prosecutorial decision, an AUSA weighs
factors such as office resources, case strengths,
and subject's culpability. However, the per-
sonalities, motivations, and objectives of the
individual AUSA frame the final decision. As
an organizational entity, each USAO sets its
unique policies on prosecutorial discretion.
The policies are based on internal reporting
requirements, minimum thresholds, and other
organizational strategies. These forces, outside
of the legal ethics framework, affect the US -
AOs ability to effectively accept cases.
The individual AUSA ideally has a
mutual goal with law enforcement agents of
crime control though effective prosecutions.
The manner in which they reach their accept-
able level of crime control varies, depending
on their personal interests, such as an inter-
est in a specific area of federal criminal law.
At one end. of the spectrum, some AUSAs will
achieve this level by maximizing the amount
of charges applied to the largest number of
defendants." These AUSAs will aggressively
accept many cases, some of which could war-
rant declination, with the result of attaining as
many convictions as possible. They will assist
their agents with "stacking" additional charges
against the defendants, encouraging them to
reach a plea agreement, avoid trial, and reach
a quick resolution, thus freeing the AUSA to
work on the next case. These AUSAs are likely
younger, risk-seeking, and interested in form-
ing a strong reputation with the law enforce-
ment community and the local bar. Through
the large number of cases prosecuted, they
get the opportunity to showcase or improve
their litigation skills3 9 An "agent's AUSA" runs
38 Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, Charge
Movement and Theories ofProsecutors, 91 Marq. L. Rev. 9,
29 (2007).
39 Id. at 31.
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the risk of creating a caseload that becomes At the other end of the spectrum are
unmanageable, leading to increased stress the AUSAs who only accept cases that are
among other problems resulting from being likely to be resolved through a plea agree-
overworked. However, they may continue to men[ due to the amount of evidence against
aggressively accept cases until they are pro- the defendant. These AUSAs only accept cases
moted, leave to work at a different firm with that seem to be gnaranteed convictions. They
solid work experience, or begin to decline are extremely risk-averse, and as such, decline
cases more often to bring down their casel- most cases because of the fear of participating
oads to manageable levels, and losing in a trial. They accept cases because
Most AUSAs will focus on specific they are winnable or there is no legitimate
excuse to decline. Rather than using the con-
crimes, as they have likely been assigned to stituitionally required probable cause standard,
a division by their management. In addi- they use the higher criminal trial standard
tion to their assigned case type, they create a of "beyond a reasonable doubt." These are
personal set of priorities on which crimes to AUSAs who are considered "retired on duty"
pursue prosecution. 40 These priorities could by their peers. They arc likely near the cud
be based on factors such as the seriousness of their careers, trying to do the required
of the crime or the defendant's criminal his- minimum to stay employed until they retire.
tory. For example, an AUSA will likely decline These AUSAs continue to make satisfactory
federal prosecution o an illegal alien with no performance evaluations because they may
criminal history under 8 U.S.C. 325 (improper be judged on their conviction rates, regard-
entry by alien). The AUSA will explain that less of the total number of cases prosecuted.
a n administrative action, such as a deporta- For example, one of these risk-averse AUSAs
tion from the United States, would be a better may have a 900 conviction rate for one year.
alternative and more effective use of federal This would seem hihly successful at first
resources. However, that same Al SA would gacbtpoeuInwsol ogti e
be more likely to accept prosecution when an ce he p rsTher 
art l ly s are e decind .
aent pesennfactorses as ho iosnessan f Those cases that could result in trial may also
member with a substantial criminal history, be avoided because a high trial rate could be
'or prosecution. In addition to charging interpreted as a sign of overzealousness or
U.S. C. 6325, the AtUSA would be able to seek ineffective negotiating skills.4' Finally, these
a ten year sentencing enhancement for being ATSAAs may simply increase their leisure time
a documented gang mnember under n8 U.S.C. by resolving more cases though guilty pleas
52i (criminal street gangs). This illustrates how and uaving high declination rates. 4 r
some AUSAs will only accept cases that could
result in their prioritized charges, maximizing Aside from the individual AUSA,
those convictions while declining cases that each USA affects its level of case declina-
involve non-priority, or lesser charges. Perhaps ion through its organizational strategies and
they will be frank with the agent, providing policies. The US Attor reys Manual requires a
advice on what investigative steps should be report when a case is closed without proseon-
followed to achieve sufficient probable cause tIon. This reporting requirement encourages
for the prioritized charges. On the other hand, case declination, as cases are declined before
the AUSA may simply decline [he case, legiti- an AUSA risks opening a USAO case and
mately citing UScO priorities, or that a state having to report case closure. When a case is
charge may be the appropriate action instead, declined before opening a USAO case, there is
The vast majority of USAs could be classified 41 Id. at 31.
in the middle of the spectrum. 42 Id.
____________43 U.S. Attorneys' Manual 9-2.020 (U.S.A.M.), 2000
40 Id. at 29-30. WL 1708083.
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no reporting requirement. Without any report,
there is no statistic or measure to provide to
the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS),
which is responsible for measuring activity
at all stages of the criminal justice system.
Among all the statistical reports provided,
the BJS also provides measures of success-
ful prosecutions for each USAO. However,
the BJS cannot accurately measure the actual
number of case declinations if no report is
filed.
prevent improper or insignificant investiga-
tions from going forward.
As part of the case intake process, each
USAO has its own informal or unwritten poli-
cies that guide case acceptance. These policies
prioritize which case types are aggressively
enforced and conversely, which case types are
occasionally enforced.4 For example, USAOs
have informal minimum thresholds for drug-
related offenses. Drug-related offenses may
have higher thresholds in the USAO for the
Southern District of Florida, because of the
THE MNTEGRALON,, OF A LAW ENFO 'J.,LEN ABENT1 i AN ADVIKRY
CAPACITY AT THE CASE WNAKEI'" POUNLO ADORES Ji CUE OF
MPROPER DFELL IAU ONS BY AWOAFRESH VIE A_, OW, TO THE OEOIhON
V. Possible Explanations
As stated by the BJS, the primary rea-
sons USAOs cite for case declinations are
case-related reasons, such as weak evidence
and other legal deficiencies.< The BJS also
recognizes many other legitimate reasons,
including lack of resources, minimal federal
interest, alternative resolutions available, etc. 5
These reasons demonstrate how the USAO
case intake process acts as a screening and
regulatory device, preventing improper pros-
ecutions from going forward while preserv-
ing a manageable caseload."6 This screening
process is the same as the screening process
performed by law enforcement agents when
deciding to initiate or continue with an inves-
tigation. Agents decide whether to initiate or
proceed with an investigation depending on
the same factors the AUSAs weigh, such as
agency resources and manpower, the strengths
of the case, or agency priorities. Agents, as well
as their management teams, screen cases to
44 See generally Bureau of Justice Statistics Basis for
Declination 2008, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/
fjsst/2008/tables/fjs08st203.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2015).
45 See id.
46 Donald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bar-
gaining Tradeoff, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 50-51(2002).
higher number of cases referred for prosecu-
tion, than in the USAO for District of Idaho.!'
Those cases that do not meet the minimum
threshold could be best handled by a state or
local prosecutor's office instead, freeing the
AUS As to focus on more important investiga-
tions. With these unique policies, the same
federal crimes will be prosecuted differently,
depending on which USAO is proceeding
with prosecution, thus showing disparities in
case declination rates.4 9
VI. Comparative Perspective
To better understand case declinations
in the U.S. federal criminal justice system,
one may look to other countries' criminal
justice systems. In the U.S., the criminal jus-
tice system is classified as an adversarial one,
where the court acts as an impartial media-
tor between the prosecution and the defense.
The court rules on issues of law, and leaves
questions of fact for the jury to decide. In
comparison, France's criminal justice system is
classified as an inquisitorial one. In an inquisi-
47 William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial
Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative, 54
Ohio St. L.J. 1325, 1344 (1993).
48 Id. at 1343.
49 Id. at 1344.
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torial system, the courts are actively involved
in some portion of an investigation.o An
inquisitorial judge may question witnesses, de-
fendants, or perform other fact-finding tasks,
while the lawyers on each side of a prosecu-
tion argue on behalf of the state or defendant.
The French criminal justice system
is organized in the Ministry of Justice (com-
parable to the U.S. Department of Justice),
which is headed by the Minister of Justice
(the American equivalent would be the Attor-
ney General).' All French prosecutors serve
in the Ministry's bureaucratic hierarchy, and
all are subject to an entrance exam before
being hired by the Ministry." Instead of the
American system that includes state and lo-
cal prosecutor's offices, the French system is
centralized in a single, unified national system.
As such, the French prosecutor's offices follow
the same uniform policies nationwide, where-
as a U.S. Attorney exercises some freedom in
setting individual policies in his USAO. With
a national system, all decisions by French
prosecutors are subject to review or possible
correction by their non-politically appointed
management." Therefore, the French model of
prosecutorial discretion is customarily car-
ried out at the supervisory ranks. Additionally,
French prosecutors are not as conviction-
driven as their American counterparts." They
are instructed to determine a just solution to
problems, which does not always necessarily
mean seeking prosecutions.
50 Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in
an Adversarial System: Lessons From Current White Collar
Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 165,
194 (2004).
51 Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as
a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do The French Do It,
How Can We Find Out, And Why Should We Care?, 78 Cal. L.
Rev. 539, 560 (1990).
52 Id.
53 Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in
an Adversarial System: Lessons From Current White Collar
Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 165,
194 (2004).
54 Yue Ma, A Comparative View ofJudicial Supervision
ofProsecutorial Discretion, 44 No. 1 Crim. Law Bulletin Art.
III (2008).
French law enforcement agents have
a unique relationship with their prosecutors.
French law enforcement agents are instructed
to notify prosecutors "without delay" upon the
discovery of an offense, and "immediately" if it
is a "flagrant" offense." This early involvement
of prosecutors allows them to act as a check
on the police, sometimes directing how the in-
vestigation should proceed, or preventing the
use of questionable investigative methods. 6 In
fact, French prosecutors are known to arrive
at the scene of an offense with the police, or
shortly thereafter7 Despite the early prosecu-
torial involvement in criminal cases, French
declination rates are comparable to those by
the USAOs."
Not all of the features of the French
inquisitorial system would be applicable in
the American adversarial system. However,
the USAOs throughout the country could
limit improper case declination by following
some of the French features. Law enforce-
ment agents should attempt to increase AUSA
participation in the early stages of investiga-
tions, similar to their French counterparts.
Likewise, USAOs should allow and encourage
the increased participation, and. not require
that a USAO case be officially opened to avoid
the reporting requirement. Perhaps creating a
general USAO case, where each AUSA could
document the early exploratory activities in
potential cases, would be suitable for USAO
accountability. Early participation by AUSAs,
without the necessary commitment to accept
the case, could decrease improper case decli-
nation.
VII. Recommendations for Change
As discussed, there is a necessity for a
level of ethical guidance for prosecutors when
declining law enforcement agent's potential
55 Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as
a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do The French Do It,
How Can We Find Out, And Why Should We Care?, 78 Cal. L.
Rev. 539, 557 (1990).
56 Id.
57 Id
58 Id at 615.
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cases. However, this absence of ethical stan-
dards is correctable. There are several rec-
ommendations that would address this need
directly and indirectly. Each potential solution
carries with it distinctive strengths and weak-
nesses to consider when implementing them.
The most direct approach to rectify the
lack of ethical guidance is by adding a new
ethical guideline to the current set. A modi-
fication to MRPC 3.8 could include a section
on declining cases. For example, an additional
section could be worded as: "the prosecutor in
a criminal case shall refrain from declining a
charge that the prosecutor knows is supported
by probable cause" (this is a purposely, closely-
worded companion to MRPC 3.8 (a)). It is con-
ceivable that this word choice could under-
mine the practice of prosecutorial discretion,
making prosecutors accept all cases supported
by probable cause. Perhaps adding a supple-
mentary phrase after the aforementioned sec-
tion would create a more flexible rule, such as
"... unless there is a valid or legitimate reason
for the declination." This would provide some
room for appropriate declinations based on
factors such as office and judicial resources,
while emphasizing that declinations should
be made carefully. The proposed section could
also be modified by replacing the words "re-
frain from" with "make reasonable efforts to
avoid," thus making the rule more permis-
sive while still addressing declinations in the
MRPC. If an additional section is not feasible,
then at least an additional comment to MRPC
3.8 could explain the same ethical theory.
The ABA has an existing amendment
process for the addition or modification of a
Model Rule. Recently, the 2oo9 ABA Commis-
sion on Ethics 20/20 was created to perform a
thorough three-year review of the Model Rules
and the American system of lawyer regula-
tion. A modified MRPC 3.8 could fit in the
Commission's transparent review and amend-
ment process, leading to a rule that has been
discussed, changed, and adopted by the ABA.
Once adopted, the newly modified MRPC 3.8
would next have to be adopted by each state's
64 Washington College of Law
judiciary. This additional review step would
ideally provide an improved rule, better suited
to the needs of each individual state. HWhen
the new MRPC 3.8 is finally adopted by the
states, it would not only provide guidance to
the USAOs, but also to the state and local
prosecutor's offices as well.
A niodified MRPC 3.8 would also be a
cost-effective alternative. The ABA, and each
state, would spend the initial time and effort
in the adoption process. However, if an adop-
tion process were already under way, such as
the present Ethics 20/20 process, then one
additional Model Rule modification would
actually lower the cost expended per Model
Rule modified or adopted. The time expended
in publishing and promoting the new Model
Rule would be relatively small because of the
Internet. The ABA's website, as well as other
free legal academic/research websites, could
publish the new Model Rule quickly. As the
new Model Rule spreads, it wonld have an
immediate impact. It would likely be taught in
ABA accredited law schools throughout the
nation within the semester, as law students
take their legal ethics class and prepare for
their nationwide ethics examination. As the
new Model Rule is taught and accepted, it can
become a new reference point for updating
other instructional sources, such as the US
Attorney'Manual and the ABA Standards.
The adoption of a new MRPC 3.8
would not come without some dilemmas.
MRPC 3.8 only affects prosecutors, a relatively
small portion of the legal profession, so it
would not be a priority for review by the ABA.
Even if the modification was proposed in an
ABA meeting, there would be expected back-
lash from prosecutors. Federal and state pros-
ecutors have a legitimate argument that the
modified MRPC 3.8 would reduce their ability
to apply prosecutorial discretion effectively.
They would explain that they already have
high caseloads despite limited office resourc-
es, particularly in the state prosecutors' offices.
A larger caseload would limit their time spent
per case and could lead to lower conviction
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rates. Another foreseeable cost would be the
development and deployment of Contin u -
ing Legal Education (CLE). Federal and state
prosecutors would have to spend at least a few
hours away from work to learn about the new
MRPC 3.8. This cost may be picked up by the
local bar association or the prosecutor's of-
fice. If these costs make the adoption of a new
MRPC 3.8 impossible to achieve, then perhaps
providing guidance, from a different view-
point, directly within the USAO could provide
change quickly.
As explained previously, each USAO
has its own distinctive case intake process.
The integration of a law
enforcement agent in an ANOTHER SLUT I
advisory capacity at the
case intake point could CREATION OF A ML
address the issue of pimproper declinations BIAR AT THE U,
by adding a fresh view- IT -E O
point to the decision.
An experienced law A N
enforcement agent, who
is not directly related IN 1,AK AUSA P
to the case being re-
ferred or to the agency ENFORCE NT AL
presenting the case,
would be able to pro-
vide valuable insight to
the AUSA making the decision. The wealth of
knowledge and education in the federal agent
ranks should be used in the intake process.
Although not a universal requirement, the vast
majority of federal agents possess an under-
graduate degree, coupled with years of investi-
gative experience. There are also many agents
who have Juris Doctors, or were practicing
attorneys before joining the law enforcement
profession (some federal agencies, such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have en-
try programs that recruit directly from Ameri-
can law schools). The agent should be de-
tached, perhaps being from an agency outside
of the U.S. Department of Justice, to avoid any
foreseeable bias. If necessary, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice has two agencies that inves-
Ligate allegations of misconduct within the
Department (Office of Inspector General) and
the USAOs (Office of Professional Responsi-
bility). These agencies have law enforcement
agents that could. participate in, or assist in the
oversight, of the USAO intake process.
The embedded agent could be from
a state or local law enforcement agency. This
would increase communication between their
agency and the USAO, providing the "locals"
with a better understanding of how a USAO
operates and how they can work together.
Case referrals from the state and local agen-
cies would increase,

















would explain his opin-
ion on whether the
probable cause thresh-
old was reached, wheth.-
er there are further
investigative steps that
should. be pursued, or
whether the case should
be declined. With the agent's experience, the
actual feasibility or futility of potential inves-
tigative steps would be debated, compared to
the AUSA's theoretical suggestions.
Placing an agent at the USAO does
pose some understandable difficulties. The
agent would require office space and equip-
ment. This could be lessened by having the
agent be at the USAO's office on a part-time
basis, or perhaps have him be subject to a
callout as needed. A conference call including
the referring agent, the AUSA, and the intake
agent, could achieve the same benefits while
limiting the office costs.
Another issue with agent placement in
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the USAO would be the increased time spent
during case intake. A. decision that may have
taken a few minutes before the placement
could become more time-consuming. The
discussion, although beneficial, would prolong
the decision, particularly if the case referred
is a difficult one. This would take time away
from the AUSA's other daily duties, whether it
be case work or case intake. A possible reso-
lution could be a predetermined time limit
for case intake to be used in those situations
where the discussion is prolonged. Regardless,
the final decision to accept a case for prosecu-
tion rests with the AUSA.. If a discussion takes
too much time, the AUSA can end it by mak-
ing the decision.
The human factor could also become
a problem with the agent placement. The
federal government has over eighty federal
agencies that have law enforcement personnel.
Since many of the agencies share investigative
authorities, cases will occasionally overlap. For
example, the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) investigates drug crimes as found
in Title 21 of the Unites States Code. However,
the FBI and Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI) also have concurrent Title 21 jurisdiction
with DEA. Natural investigative overlaps such
as these have led to tense rivalries between
agencies. If the embedded agent participates
in a case referral from an agency that he does
not care for, there is a risk that he may sabo-
tage the case and improperly advocate for
case declination. The opposite is also true: an
agent could zealously push for prosecution in
one of his agency's cases, despite there being
reasons for declination. Similarly, if an agent
knows that the embedded agent is from a rival
agency, the case may never reach the USAO
and instead be presented to the state or local
prosecutor's office.
Another solution would be the creation
of a multi-person review board at the USAO's
case intake point. The board would consist of
a combination of the original intake AUSA
personnel, law enforcement agents, and state
or local prosecutors. Much like the single
agent placement, the board would encourage
discussion and increase transparency. Howev-
er, because of time constraints, this board may
not be practical for situations where a war-
rantless arrest is imminent. This board could
act as a review committee for longer-term
investigations that are presented for prosecu-
tion. If declination is appropriate, a state or
local prosecutor would be present to assist the
agent with presenting the case to their office.
VIII. Conclusion
After review of various ethical sources,
both past and present, as well as other factors
affecting case declination, it is apparent that
there is a need for ethical guidance for AUSAs
when making the important decision to de-
cline a law enforcement agent's case for pros-
ecution. There is presently a lack of guidance
in the ethical sources, specifically the Model
Rules, which can guide AUSAs when decid-
ing to decline cases.\A proposed amendment
to the Model Rules, providing factors such as
those found in the US Attorney'siianual to
consider when declining a case, would be a
direct and cost effective improvement to the
status quo.
66 Washington College of Law Fall 20141 14




Elhrick J. Cerdan is a Special Agent with U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Inves-
tigations (HSI). He also serves as an intelligence officer with
the United States Navy Reserve. He received his J.D. from
the Oklahoma City University School of Law and his M.B.A.
in Finance and Management Science and B.B.A. in Market-
ing from the University of Miami School of Business. The
views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.
Fall 9014 Washington College of Law 67 15
Cerdan: Improving the Ethical Guidelines for Assistant United States Atto
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2014
.U
16
Criminal Law Practitioner, Vol. 2 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol2/iss1/6
